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The American Native Beef project involved a failed attempt to establish cow
and bull slaughter operation in Southeast Oklahoma. The effort was initially orga-
nized as a new generation cooperative and raised over US$2.5M from area produc-
ers who retained their funds in escrow for over 5 years despite numerous oppor-
tunities to withdraw their investment. The business model was restructured several
times to attract equity capital from outside investors. The case provides insights
into the linkages between business strategy and business structure. It also raises the
question as to whether the project could have been successful under the original
business model.
Background
Cattle and calves are the most valuable commodity in Oklahoma. Between 1998
and 2008, the statewide annual average was well over ﬁve million head. Oklahoma
ranks ﬁfth in terms of cattle and calves inventory, trailing only Texas, Nebraska,
California, and Kansas (United States Department of Agriculture-National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service [USDA-NASS] 2007). However, unlike these other states,
Oklahoma’s cattle numbers include considerably fewer feedlot cattle shipped in
from other states and fewer large dairies. Most of Oklahoma’s cattle and calves are
associated with the state’s multitude of cow-calf operations or stocker calves placed
on winter wheat pastures or summer range pastures.
In search of value-added proﬁts, in the fall of 2000 a group of cattle produc-
ers in southeastern Oklahoma began to explore the idea of a culled cow slaughter
company. Part of the rationale for the project was the large number of cow-calf op-
erations in the region and a lack of processing facilities. One perceived advantage
was reduced transportation costs in cattle procurement. The group estimated that
over 150,000 cows and bulls were transported annually out of the Oklahoma re-
gion for slaughter. In a Livestock Weekly (2001) article, project steering committee
member Mason Mungle summarized the project’s rationale:
“As we look at nearly all sectors of the agriculture business—well,
really all sectors of the agriculture business—we ﬁnd that the larger,
Phil Kenkel and Rodney Holcomb are professors in the Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics at Oklahoma State University.Vol. 23[2009] 167
multinational corporations are the only place we have to market our
cattle. What we want to do is provide that extra buyer at the livestock
market that’ll be able to compete. It looks like, to us at least, we would
be better off $3 per hundred weight because of the trucking that they
have to margin out” at other plants.
Incorporating the business as a cooperative appeared to have additional advan-
tages. The prospective membership, comprised of cattle producers from the south-
eastern part of the state, could provide a supply of cattle to the cooperative. Un-
like fed cattle, which are supplied from feed yards on a year-round basis, the sup-
ply of cull cattle tends to be seasonal, peaking in the fall. It was envisioned that
a farmer-owned project could coordinate with producers in scheduling delivery.
The group also foresaw opportunities from conditioning cattle (holding cattle on
grass) to smooth out seasonal supplies. The availability of funding from grants, tax
credits, and the success of similar ventures were also factors in pursuing the co-
operative form. The successful equity drive of the Value Added Products (VAP)
Cooperative in northwestern Oklahoma and the success of the U.S. Premium Beef
(USPB) Cooperative in Kansas City Missouri fueled interest in a cooperative effort.
A 30 percent tax credit offered by the state of Oklahoma to producers investing
in value added businesses was another positive factor. The tax credit did not place
restrictions on the business form, but was initially limited to agricultural producers
investing in new value-added ventures in the state.
In early 2000, a steering committee that included a core group of producers
applied for a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Value-Added Agri-
culture Market Development Grant, now referred to as the Value-Added Producer
Grant program. The group called their potential business American Native Beef.
The rationale for the name was to suggest a linkage between farmers and ranch-
ers and to differentiate themselves from imported beef (e.g., Australian or New
Zealand). The organizational effort formally began with a meeting of southeastern
Oklahoma cattle producers in February 2001, where project organizers discussed
the concept of a cull cow and bull slaughter cooperative. Based on a preliminary
review of projects proposed in other states, the group estimated project costs at
US$10 million. The meeting concluded with a strong consensus that the feasibility
of such a project should be explored.
Industry Background
According to USDA data, in 1997 there were 636 federally inspected plants
operating in the U.S. for processing slaughtered steers and heifers (fed cattle) and
cow and bull (cull cattle) (USDA-NASS 2008). In that year, the plants processed
a total of 33.1 million head of cattle. There were 18 plants processing more than168 Journal of Cooperatives
one million head on an annual basis, accounting for 58 percent of all beef slaughter
(USDA-NASS 2008). The fed cattle segment of the beef processing industry is the
most concentrated, with the top four ﬁrms accounting for 80 percent of steers and
heifers slaughtered in the U.S. (Barkema, Draberstott, & Novak 2008). Cow and
bull slaughter represented 18 percent of total beef slaughter (USDA-NASS 2008).
The cow and bull slaughter industry is less concentrated than fed cattle slaughter,
and regional or family-owned ﬁrms are more prevalent (Mathews et al. 1999).
The American Native Beef (ANB) business plan reported six major regional or
family-owned competitors, including Northern States Packing (ConAgra) in Om-
aha, NE, with a capacity of 1,800 head/day; Caviness Pack in Hereford, TX; Lone
Star Corp. in San Angelo, TX; San Angelo Packing Co. in San Angelo, TX; and
BookerPackingCompanyinBooker,TX,eachwithacapacityof600–700head/day.
Western Missouri Packing Co. in Rockville, MO, with a daily capacity of 175 head,
was also listed.
In 2006, approximately one million head of cows and bulls were slaughtered
in a ﬁve-state region of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.
Total cattle inventory for the same period was slightly over 23 million (USDA-
NASS 2007). Based on a 10 percent cull rate, the region would generate over two
million head of cows and bulls for slaughter, indicating that a majority of cows and
bulls are shipped out of the region for slaughter. Together, these data indicate that
incumbent ﬁrms would not challenge entry by a producer-owned cooperative.
Conceptual Framework
Hansmann (1988, 1996, 1999) uses a property rights approach to examine the
rationale for the structure of ownership in a ﬁrm. He notes the cost of ownership,
which includes monitoring, collective decision-making, risk bearing, and contract-
ing. Firms with diverse ownership face issues such as asymmetric information, con-
ﬂicts of interest, and higher costs of oversight. The transaction costs associated with
trying to keep highly diversiﬁed investor groups satisﬁed is a major reason why
most enterprises have relatively homogeneous investors. In the case of a cooper-
ative corporation, where residual returns ﬂow to the supplier of the commodity,
patron investors have a uniform goal for patronage returns. In investor-owned cor-
porations, investor-owners have a uniform goal for investment returns and claim
residual proﬁts. Combining ownership groups creates conﬂict of interests that must
be controlled through monitoring and contractual arrangements.
Despite these challenges, a recent evolution of the cooperative business model
has involved the development of cooperatives with non-patron equity. This structure
providestwoclassesofownership:outsideequityinvestorsandpatronstockholders.
The entity returns are split between the two classes, with the outside investors re-Vol. 23[2009] 169




identiﬁes the obligations and tradeoffs of outside cooperative equity from a legal
perspective.
A number of states, including Wyoming, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Tennessee,
have enacted legislation enabling cooperative/limited liability company (LLC) hy-
brids. While there are differences in individual state statutes, this structure man-
dates control by patron members, but also allows the investor class to receive up to
85 percent of proﬁts (Hensley & Swanson 2003).
The major rationale for hybrid cooperative/investor-owned business models is
the ﬁrm’s ability to access a greater pool of investment capital. For this reason,
a hybrid business model may target an institutional investor or venture capitalist.
However, there are inherent difﬁculties in matching venture capital with agricultural
projects in rural communities (Freshwater et al. 2008). Venture capital ﬁrms prefer
to concentrate on projects with high growth rates, that operate in large markets, and
that provide ready exit strategies. Because of the hands-on nature of project eval-
uation, venture capitalists are disinclined to invest in projects that are physically
remote from their other activities. Organizers of rural businesses are often unwill-
ing to accept the management and control conditions set by the venture capital
suppliers.
In a similar light, Alexander and Alcala (2006) conclude that private and insti-
tutional investors typically limit investments to projects with high short-run returns
(over 20 percent), proven operating models, and expectations to exit the project
within ﬁve to seven years. They also discuss the complex structures required, such
asmultipleclassesofstock,differentialvotingrights,equitycurerights,andmanda-
tory sweeps of excess cash ﬂow.
Collectively, this literature suggests that there are fundamental challenges to
meetingthedivergentdemandsofpatronandinvestorowners.TheAmericanNative
Beef effort illustrates these challenges.
Analysis of the Venture
Key Individuals
Mason Mungle, a southeastern Oklahoma cow-calf producer, was a driving
force behind the effort and helped organize the 11-member steering committee of
area producers. Faculty from Oklahoma State University’s Department of Agricul-
tural Economics and Food and Agricultural Products Center also worked closely170 Journal of Cooperatives
with the project. The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, a not-for-proﬁt foundation
that provides education and assistance to agricultural producers, also assisted with
the effort. Dan Childs, an agricultural economist at the Noble Foundation, served
as one of the incorporating directors listed in the cooperative’s offering document.
The Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (ODAFF) also
helped coordinate the organizational meeting and strongly supported the project.
Department ofﬁcials had a long-standing goal of attracting a cattle-processing op-
eration to the state. Past efforts had convinced them that industry concentration and
scale economies made the processing of fed cattle infeasible for Oklahoma. The
ODAFF saw the proposed cow slaughter cooperative as a more realistic chance
to create a beef-related value-added business within the state. Gary Bledsoe, an
ODAFF business development specialist, described his agency’s goals in an August
2001 press release related to the ANB effort:
“We’re somewhat tired of sending all of our raw products out of state to
process somewhere else and then haul it back. Out-of-state processors
take advantage of all the jobs and rural economic development brought
about by processing activities. We’d like to bring those things here.”
Formation
In the spring of 2001, the ANB project received a USDA Value-Added Agricul-
tural Product Market Development Grant for US$195,000 and a US$100,000 loan
from ODAFF. In order to have a legal entity to receive the funds, the group formed a
limited liability company, American Native Beef LLC, on 11 April 2001. The funds
were used to contract with a nationally recognized ﬁrm for a feasibility study and
business plan.
The preliminary report from the feasibility study was delivered in January 2002.
The study estimated the annual capital costs for a 100,000 head/year slaughter and
fabrication operation at US$13.3 million. The results also indicated that a slaughter
and fabricating operation that produced fresh beef would be unlikely to be prof-
itable. Cow and bull prices would either have to decrease by 12–14 percent or meat
values would have to increase by 10–12 percent in order for the project to be prof-
itable. The study also examined a combined slaughter and further processing opera-
tion. The further processing activities included ground beef products (e.g., beef pat-
ties, meatballs, and Salisbury steak), sausage products (hot dogs, summer sausage,
and bratwurst), and whole muscle products (marinated pre-cooked beef roasts and
beef jerky). The further processing activities were projected to add US$6.3 million
to the project, bringing the total project cost to around US$20 million. The returns
for the integrated slaughter and further processing operation were more favorable
with a projected return on equity (ROE) of 23 percent.Vol. 23[2009] 171
During the spring of 2002, the project steering committee met on a weekly basis
to discuss the proposed company’s structure. The coordination of cattle supplies
was perceived as a major strategic advantage. However, some committee members
were concerned that delivery commitments would deter potential patron investors.
The issue of how deliveries would be allocated throughout the year was discussed
in depth.
Another structural consideration was the minimum level of investment. Out-
side advisors recommended a high minimum investment (US$10,000–$25,000) to
help the project reach its equity goal. However, some steering committee members
were convinced that a high investment level would prevent smaller producers from
joining. In the end, the committee set the minimum investment at US$5,000.
The issue of cattle pricing was also contentious. Instead of concentrating on
processing returns, some steering committee members focused on cattle sourcing.
Alternatives for purchasing based on live or carcass weight were discussed, along
with issues relating to condemned carcasses. Like most producer groups, the ANB
steering committee had much more interest in issues relating to cattle sources com-
pared to details of plant design and processing. They also had difﬁculty adjusting
from their traditional producer perspective to that of an owner of the processing
stage.
In late May 2002, the steering committee requested and received a business
plan for an integrated cow and bull slaughter and further processing operation. The
capital cost estimate for plant, property, and equipment (PPE) for a 400 head/day
(100,000 head/year) operation had increased to US$25 million. The business was
described as a Section 521 cooperative. Equity investment was set at US$250/share
and each share was associated with a delivery right/obligation of one animal. The
minimum investment was 20 shares or US$5,000. The business plan stated that the
cooperative would sell 50,000 to 100,000 shares of common stock, which implied
equity investment of US$12.5 million–$25 million. This structure would require
2,500 investors at a minimum. The plan showed an ROE of 34 percent.
The Equity Drive for the Project Under a Cooperative Business Model
The equity drive for the cooperative was formally initiated on 31 October 2002.
The offering was conducted using the Section 521 cooperative association exemp-
tion from registration under the Securities Exchange Act. The offering was sched-
uled to end on 14 February 2003 unless extended. The document stated a minimum
offering of US$12.5 million (100,000 shares at US$250 per share, with each share
carrying the delivery obligation of one head of cattle). The members’ investment
would be held in escrow until the US$12.5 million threshold was reached. The of-
fering further speciﬁed that up to US$5 million of preferred stock could also be172 Journal of Cooperatives
sold. The preferred stock was offered with a dividend rate set at 1 percent above
prime interest rate, not to exceed 8 percent. The preferred stock was also speciﬁed
to be convertible into common stock at “the Board’s calculation of the fair value of
the common stock.”
The offering document also described an “expanded” cattle delivery system. In
addition to scheduled physical delivery and participation in the conditioning pool,
the document indicated that cattle could be delivered through sales at an auction
barn at which an ANB buyer was present, using a purchasing agent to buy cattle in
the member’s name, or assigning delivery rights to an associate member who would
undertake delivery. Later, in a 6 March 2003 press release, steering committee chair
Mungle stressed these delivery options:
“But some misunderstanding exists regarding the various methods by
which members may satisfy their delivery obligation. A member may
deliver his own cattle to the plant; he may deliver purchased cattle;
he may instruct the plant to purchase cattle and deliver on his behalf.
Annual dividends are earned equally with any method.”
While promoting the supply system as a strategic advantage, the group was
clearly concerned that delivery commitments might be an obstacle to attracting
producer investment. Because of these concerns, the original offering document
indicated that the board had not ﬁnalized the delivery system and was continuing to
study options, including alternatives that would jeopardize the cooperative’s Sec-
tion 521 tax status. The possible loss of Section 521 tax status and the possible
conversion of the cooperative to an alternative business form were discussed in the
“risk factors” section of the offering document:
“It is possible that our Members will not be able to deliver sufﬁcient
cattle to meet our delivery demands or that the delivery arrangements
we have proposed for our Members may not satisfy the Federal tax and
other legal requirements for maintaining a cooperative. If this occurs,
we may convert from a cooperative to a business corporation or limited
liability company.”
The offering’s discussion of the implications of the possible conversion included
a change from patronage to investment-based earning distribution and changes in
voting rights from one member-one vote to investment based voting.
Despite the mention of possible conversion to a non-cooperative business form
and concerns over members’ ability to provide sufﬁcient cattle numbers, ANB’s
public relations efforts strongly enforced the notion that the group was focused
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as a new generation cooperative and included a uniform marketing agreement that
speciﬁed delivery commitments. In the section describing “Our Business Strategy,”
the offering stated, “with Member ownership and sourcing, we will have marketing
opportunities not available to other facilities.” The document went on to discuss
the possibility of labeling beef as “source identiﬁed” or “natural,” and declared
an advantage to marketing the company as “farmer owned” and the products as
“farmer produced.” In a 13 February 2003 press release, Don Covington, a steering
committee member, described the project:
“This plant will be producer owned, will have value added, and it will
be a closed cooperative. We intend that the plant will provide a viable
market for our members’ slaughter cows and bulls and a means of re-
alizing added value from their beef....This slaughter/processing plant
will succeed for three reasons. One, it is producer owned. Farmers are
trusted and the possibility of identify preserved certiﬁcation. Two, it is
a new generation, hygienically superior processing plant. And three, it
is in close proximity to Oklahoma and North Texas food companies.”
By the end of December 2002, the project team had conducted approximately
75producermeetings,reachingapproximately2,000potentialmembers.Theequity
drive had raised approximately US$2.5 million from slightly over 200 investors (an
average of roughly US$10,200/member). Over half the members invested the min-
imum amount of US$5,000. The total raised, however, was substantially below the
US$12.5 million equity goal. Approximately 10 percent of the producers attending
an equity-drive meeting ended up investing. However, over 90 percent of investors
were located within a 50-mile radius of the proposed plant location. While the in-
vestment ratio compared favorably with other producer-owned projects, it implied
that to meet the equity goal, equity meetings would have to reach over 10,000 addi-
tional producers and expand its geographic focus.
First Restructuring of the Cooperative Business Model
In response to the slow pace of the equity drive, the chairman of the steering
committee proposed a number of bylaw changes while retaining the cooperative
businessform.Thechairmanperceivedaprobleminobtaininglargepatron/investors—
only two members had invested more than US$50,000 (200 head delivery rights)—
so the proposed changes included board representation for large producers, propor-
tional voting, and differential cattle pricing to reﬂect size efﬁciencies in delivery
logistics. The proposed structural changes were never enacted because both smaller
producer members of the steering committee objected and the group concluded (as
the Hansmann model would suggest) that they would be ineffective in generating
signiﬁcantly more patron investment.174 Journal of Cooperatives
As the 14 February 2003 equity drive deadline approached, the project orga-
nizers were clearly disappointed with the producer response. In comments later re-
ported in an article in Meat and Poultry, ANB Steering Committee President Mason
Mungle discussed his frustration with the fundraising effort:
“We are disappointed because cow-calf producers put the project to-
gether....We tried to sell it in the best possible way to other producers
who said they needed it. Yet these producers won’t come to the ta-
ble with any money. ...The project is extremely viable so ANB will
look for different partners if cow-calf producers don’t support it” (Kay
2003).
Shortly before the equity drive deadline, the steering committee made the de-
cision to extend the drive until 15 May 2003 (later extended again through 2005).
At the time of each extension, investors were given the option of withdrawing their
funds. However, over 96 percent of the investors elected to let their funds remain in
escrow.
Blended Cooperative and LLC Structures
The steering committee began exploring restructuring the business as a cooper-
ative and limited liability company blend. At that point, the Wyoming Processing
Cooperative Law had been enacted, but was still poorly understood. ANB’s legal
counselproposeda three-entitybusinessstructureof US$5millionpatronand US$5
million of non-patron investors. The committee had by this point decided to adjust
its business plan and revise the total project cost to US$20 million.
One structural consideration was rooted in a desire to continue to avoid regis-
tration with the Securities Exchange Commission (Security Exchange Commission
[SEC] 2006). In addition to the cooperative association exemption, a company may
sell its securities to what are known as “accredited investors.” The SEC deﬁnition of
“accredited investor” includes a corporation or partnership with over US$5 million
in assets and an individual with either US$1 million in net worth or US$200,000
of income in each of the two most recent years and a reasonable expectation of the
same income level in the current year (SEC 2006). The proposed new structure as-
sumed that ANB could obtain enough additional equity to reach the US$5 million
level needed for a corporation exemption and could identify individuals who met
the deﬁnition of accredited investors to form the US$1 million investor component.
Asthecooperativeexamined restructuring alternatives,thepossibilityofobtain-
ing New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) was discussed. The NMTC were initiated in
December 2000 as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act (New Markets
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income communities and rural areas. The program works by channeling a 39 per-
cent tax credit (which accrues over seven years) through Community Development
Entities (CDE). The CDEs use the capital derived from the credit to help make in-
vestments in projects and businesses in low-income areas (New Markets Tax Credit
Coalition 2007). Because of the proposed southeastern Oklahoma location of the
ANB plant, the project appeared to qualify for the credits.
The change in business structure was essential for accessing the credit. Tax
credits had not been considered for the cooperative because, operating as a Section
521 cooperative, the ﬁrm would not be expected to generate taxable income at the
business level, which could be offset by the tax credits. ANB’s producer members
could not obtain the tax credits unless they channeled their investments through
a CDE. However, that investment structure would not qualify for the cooperative
association SEC exemption and would therefore necessitate a security exchange
ﬁling. Under the new combination business structure, it was now assumed that the
NMTC could be channeled to the investor partners.
The steering committee and legal counsel completed a term sheet for a new
business structure on 13 June 2003. The structure was even more complex and
involved the creation of three additional LLCs. The ﬁrst, Investment LLC, would be
owned by both the ANB cooperative, which was to hold US$4 million in common
equity, and outside investors, who were to hold US$6 million in preferred equity
with a 12 percent cumulative dividend. The cumulative feature implied that if the
project were unable to pay a 12 percent dividend in any particular year, the unpaid
portion would be added to payments in following years.
Investment LLC would, in turn, invest in Rural Enterprises of Oklahoma Inc.
(REI) LLC. REI would be a CDE vehicle for obtaining NMTC. REI would receive
a transaction fee for obtaining the tax credits, but would not participate in the proﬁts
of the project. REI would own Beef LLC, the entity that would construct and oper-
ate the processing plant. The US$4 million producer/US$6 million venture capital
structure of Investments LLC was based on the group’s assessment of additional pa-
tron members. It was not clear how the group planned to avoid security registration
given that the ANB cooperative investment was below the US$5 million threshold
for an accredited corporate member.
The steering committee began work to identify outside investors and venture
capital groups that could provide the investment capital. On 15 November 2003,
ANB sent a letter to the membership indicating that the cooperative had a verbal
commitment from a venture capital group for US$6 million and were working on
a US$10 million government guaranteed loan package. The letter, once again, out-
lined members’ ability to withdraw their investment, but encouraged them to help
raise US$2 million of additional patron equity.176 Journal of Cooperatives
Series LLC and New Market Tax Credits
The term sheet for what the steering committee called the “blended cooper-
ative and limited liability company” was publicly released in December 2003. It
revealed that the business structure had further evolved. The REI LLC, which was
to be the vehicle for the tax credits, would be a Delaware Series LLC. The series
LLC is essentially a single umbrella entity that has the ability to partition its assets
and liabilities among various sub-LLCs or series. Each sub-LLC may have differ-
ent assets, economic structures, members, and managers. The proﬁts, losses, and
liabilities of each series are legally separate from the other series, thereby creating
a ﬁrewall between each series. It also eliminates the administrative burden and ex-
pense of forming multiple LLCs (Limited Liability Company Center 2006). In this
case, REI had presumably decided to create a series LLC to manage NMTC for a
number of projects. The tax credits associated with the ANB project would be in
one series of the entity.
In addition to this change, the proﬁt distribution formula was modiﬁed. The 12
percent cumulative dividend of the investor partners would be redeemed at the end
of the seventh year. The redemption amount was set so that the investor members
were guaranteed a 21 percent internal rate of return on their investment. In response
to the proposed structure, faculty at Oklahoma State University incorporated a sim-
ulation analysis into a feasibility spreadsheet that had been prepared by a business
consultant. The simulation analysis used the same average price levels assumed in
the business plan, but also used historical variation in live cow and carcass cutout
prices to model year-to-year variations. The analysis indicated that there was only
a 42 percent likelihood that the project would generate sufﬁcient cash ﬂows to pay
the dividends provided to investor partners.
Issues also emerged over delivery rights, which now represented less than one-
fourth of the proposed slaughter volume. Venture capital representatives who re-
viewed the business plan highlighted cattle supplies as a key risk area and asked
the steering committee to provide greater detail on their plans for cattle acquisition.
This was a dramatic reﬂection of how the business structure had evolved given that
theoriginalstrategicadvantagehadbeenbasedoncattlesupplylogistics.Itwasalso
becoming increasingly unclear whether the cooperative leg of the structure could
maintain its Section 521 tax status. Venture capital representatives urged the coop-
erative to scale up the delivery rights so that the anticipated patron investors would
provide the number of cattle needed for processing. ANB members were reluctant
to scale up the delivery obligations because higher levels would likely exceed the
number of cull cattle that the investing producers would have available. Because
the cooperative had continued to de-emphasize physical delivery, it was also be-Vol. 23[2009] 177
coming evident that most members intended to fulﬁll their obligation by having the
cooperative purchase cattle in their name.
Final Search for Capital
Throughout 2004 and after further extension of the equity drive, the steering
committee continued to seek venture capital and encourage additional producer in-
vestments. The committee also worked to arrange a government guaranteed loan.
At the anticipated level of borrowing, the bank originating the loan would receive a
70 percent loan guarantee. The Oklahoma bank that had handled the escrow funds
indicated that it was not interested in participating in the loan funding. Operating
under the assumption that the loan commitment would help to convince venture
capital and producer investment, the steering committee focused their efforts on
identifying a bank willing to serve as the lead on a guaranteed loan.
During the ﬁnal search for funding, the committee worked with a number of
business consultants. ANB paid over US$65,000 to consultants who also worked on
a contingency basis and would receive a speciﬁed percentage of the total funding if
they successfully arranged the debt and venture capital. Because the ANB project
had exhausted the USDA Value-Added Grant funds, faculty at Oklahoma State Uni-
versity assisted the team in updating the business plan. Despite these efforts, the
committee was unable to secure commitments for venture capital ﬁnancing. They
were also unable to locate a lead bank for a guaranteed loan. In a September 2008
interview, Mungle commented on the difﬁculties in attracting venture capital: “We
discoveredthatventurecapitalistswantedalevelofreturnandapaybacktimeframe
that simply exceeded our project’s proﬁt potential.”
ANB’s difﬁculties in securing ﬁnancing were not unique in the meat industry.
Capital ﬁnancing for meat processing projects had been drying up for several years.
A May 2003 article in Meat and Poultry discussed the capital crisis in the meat
industry:
“Given the uncertainties over the war with Iraq, food safety issues, dis-
ruptions to exports, drought and feed costs, a possible ban on packer
ownership of livestock, and a host of other issues, fewer investors and
lenders are prepared to risk ﬁnancing existing operations, let alone in-
vesting in new ones” (Kay 2003).
The article went on to discuss a number of factors that were limiting capital, includ-
ing low margins, a possible Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak,
and the failure of the Future Beef Operation in Arkansas City, Kansas. The article
also indicated that single plant projects were particularly difﬁcult to ﬁnance because
“zero tolerance food safety regulations” made these projects particularly risky. As178 Journal of Cooperatives
the business structure shifted from producer ﬁnancing to investor ﬁnancing, the at-
titude of outside investors toward the beef processing industry became critically
important.
End of a Grassroots Effort
The ﬁnal chapter of the ANB effort was written on 3 June 2006, when the steer-
ing committee informed the membership that the effort was being abandoned. In-
ability to secure debt ﬁnancing was cited as the chief reason. The group’s inability
to secure venture capital or additional producer ﬁnancing was not highlighted.
“The ANB Steering Committee has been working diligently for ﬁve
years trying to make this beef processing plant a reality. However, our
lead bank, has had a change in personnel and is no longer interested
in being our lead bank. Without a lead bank we cannot move forward
with our project. Therefore, we believe it is time to refund the money
we have been holding in escrow for you, our members.”
Precise information on the amount of funds remaining in escrow by June 2006
is not available. However, conversations with steering committee members suggest
thatahighpercentageoftheoriginalinvestors,possiblyover80percent,maintained
their investment with the project despite numerous opportunities (available at every
extension of the equity drive) to withdraw their funds. Maintaining member ﬁnan-
cial commitment over the ﬁve-year period should be regarded as clear evidence of
the deep grassroots support for the project.
Conclusions
The ANB effort presents an interesting example of a project where producer
investors could not be dissuaded and outside investors could not be persuaded to in-
vest. ANB’s producer members had a strong commitment to the project, primarily
becauseofitspotentialtoimproveproﬁtabilityfortheircullcattle.Astheprojector-
ganizers realized that producers would not be able to provide sufﬁcient equity, they
restructured the business model to accommodate outside investment. Reﬂecting this
shift in focus, the ﬁnal business structure was inﬂuenced by security exchange is-
sues, new market tax credits, and venture capital advisors. It was quite complex and
concentrated solely on venture capital ﬁrms to provide the outside investment. A
simple categorization of the business restructuring steps and issues is provided in
table 1.
As previously discussed, Hansmann (1988) identiﬁes transactions costs and
conﬂicts of interests of heterogeneous owner groups. ANB’s restructured business
model did not address these issues. The steering committee consisted of cattle pro-Vol. 23[2009] 179
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ducers and advisors. The term sheet for the blended LLC provided board represen-
tation for the non-patron investors. However, there were no non-patron investors
on the steering committee. The venture capital investors who were being asked to
supply 60 percent of the capital may not have been convinced that the project was
geared to their interests. The nature of the project—ramping up production of an
integrated slaughter and processing facility—also did not provide the short-run re-
turns and clear exit strategy favored by venture capital investors. The decision to
focus on venture capital was driven by a need to ﬁnd accredited investors and thus
avoid a registered security offering. In light of the issues raised by Freshwater et al.
(2008) and Alexander and Alcala (2006), it is not surprising that the venture capital
investment did not materialize.
It is difﬁcult to speculate on how the ANB project would have fared had it be-
gun with a blended cooperative/LLC business form and structured its fundraising
to meet the diverging needs of producer and outside private investors. Conceptu-
ally, the blended model could capture a cooperative’s advantage in supply control
meshed with an LLC’s ﬂexibility in attracting equity. A successful project would
need to involve both producer and investor stakeholders in the steering committee
and organizational effort. The level and timing of the projected returns would have
to be consistent with the goals of private investors. All the issues that ANB faced in
designing a delivery system and allocating returns between producer and investor
partners would also have to be successfully navigated. In a September 2008 inter-
view, Mungle commented on the ﬁnal business model:
“The new generation cooperative structure was key to at least having
a base level supply to the plant. The cooperative model was good. We
had a good business plan and the right management team in place. We
just discovered too late that we had to include outside equity capital.
We also didn’t have the knowledge to attract outside investment.”
The ANB project demonstrates the complexities of restructuring an emerging
cooperative into a blended cooperative and investor ﬁrm. A major rationale for hy-
brid business structures is access to a greater pool of capital, and the ANB project
illustrates the difﬁculties in attracting outside investors. Groups pursuing similar
models will need to design both their organizational effort and business strategies
to meet the long-term goals of both producer and investor stakeholders.
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